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ABORTIONS AND STERILIZATIONS
decision were reached it would have been a better result than shying
away from the right because the balance was difficult or controversial or
because it called into question medical opinions. Constitutional rights
can be dealt with and medical concerns may at the same time be given
due weight and respect.
Epic M. NEWMAN
Hospitals-A Current Analysis of the Right to Abortions and
Sterilizations in the Fourth Circuit: State Action and the
Church Amendment
The United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade' found that the
right of privacy guarantees a woman the prerogative of having an
abortion "free of interference by the State."2 The right of privacy also
includes the fundamental right to decide whether to bear or beget a
child3 and therefore implicitly encompasses the sterilization decision.4
However, in Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton,' the Court let stand
a section of the challenged Georgia abortion statute that allows a hospital
to refuse to admit a patient for an abortion. The Court noted that the
purpose of this provision was "obviously... to afford appropriate pro-
tection.., to -the denominational hospital."6 Thus an enigma remains:
how valuable is the Roe guarantee to an abortion or sterilization free of
state interference if under Doe some hospitals may absolutely refuse to
admit patients for such operations?'
As Roe guarantees abortions "free of interference by the State," an
initial inquiry must concern the scope of the duty thus imposed. Clear-
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 163. The absoluteness of the right depends on the trimester of
pregnancy concerned.
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
4. Compare the sterilization decision with the personal rights listed in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-53 that have been held to be part of the right of privacy.
5. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
6. Id. at 198. However, the Court generally spoke in terms of "hospital" without
any qualification.
7. The Roe and Doe opinions are to be read together. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at
165.
8. See Note, Hill-Burton Hospitals after Roe and Doe: Can Federally Funded
Hospitals Refuse to Perform Abortions?, 4 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83, 84
(1974).
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ly a state cannot pass a statute forbidding abortions during the first two
trimesters of pregnancy since the Roe decision directly invalidated such
a statute.9 But the Supreme Court has not yet determined whether the
state ever has a duty to insure the availability of such procedures. 10 If
the state must insure access to facilities that offer these operations, the
nature of the state's relationship with a particular hospital becomes
crucial for execution of this duty. Hospitals generally incorporate and,
thus, traditionally have been classified as either public or private by
corporation law.11 The due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment has been held to apply to public hospitals in the context of staff
membership. 12  The Supreme 'Court in Roe found the right to an
abortion to be based on the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.13 Thus, not surprisingly, several courts since Roe have held that
a public hospital must allow nontherapeutic abortions and sterilizations
when the hospital offers other procedures that involve the same amount
of risk and care, and when the hospital's failure to allow abortions or
sterilizations would result in denial of the patient's fundamental right to
such operations.' 4 If these courts are correct in construing Roe as
imposing an affirmative duty' on the state to insure that a publicly
owned hospital that offers medically indistinguishable procedures also
offers abortions and sterilizations when the individual's fundamental
right would otherwise be abridged, then, upon a finding of state action,
9. 410 U.S. at 164.
10. The Supreme Court recently denied a writ of certiorari to two cases that would
have potentially presented this issue to the Court: Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 44
U.S.L.W. 3492 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976) (White, J. and Burger, C.J., dissenting), denying
cert. to 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975) (sterilization); Greo v. Orange Memorial Hosp.
Corp., 96 S. Ct. 433, 436 (1975) (White, J. and Burger, CJ., dissenting), denying cert.
to 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975) (abortion).
11. Note, The Physician's Right to Hospital Staff Membership: The Public-Private
Dichotomy, 1966 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 485, 486. The author argues that since the purpose
of a hospital is to serve the public rather than to make a profit, the public/private
dichotomy has little meaning in the hospital context. Apart from corporation law, the
distinction is invalid since public and private hospitals cannot be distinguished on the
basis of purpose or function. Id. at 514-15.
12. See cases collected in id. at 487-91.
13. 410 U.S. at 153.
14. See Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 1975) (abortion); Doe v. Hale
Hosp., 500 F.2d 144, 147 (1st Cir. 1974) (abortion); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495
F.2d 1342, 1347, 1378 (8th Cir. 1974) (abortion); Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp.,
475 F.2d 701, 705-06 (1st Cir. 1973) (sterilization). The actions were based on the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
15. Although the Constitution does not usually impose an affirmative duty on a
state, the state's previous involvement in unconstitutional conduct may allow for such an
imposition. A state's unconstitutional abortion statute should suffice for this inolve-
ment and render any later attempt at neutrality insufficient for adequate protection of
the right to an abortion. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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Roe would also compel the state to require a private hospital to offer
such procedures under identical circumstances. Whether the requisite
state action can be found in a private hospital's receipt of Hill-Burton
funds is unclear.
The Hill-Burton Act 6 provides a highly regulated program de-
signed to assist a state in furnishing adequate hospital care to all its
citizens. Once a state decides to participate in the program, a state
agency is responsible for administering the plan within the statutory
guidelines.' 7 The Fourth Circuit has consistently held that a hospital's
receipt of Hill-Burton funds is a sufficient basis for a finding of state
action.18 Although it has never directly addressed the issue in the
abortion-sterilization context, in the recent case of Doe v. Charleston
Area Medical Center, Inc.,'9 the court implied that it would also apply
this state action doctrine in such cases.20 Whether the Fourth Circuit
should apply this theory of state action in the abortion-sterilization
context must be considered in light of recent judicial and congressional
action to the contrary.
The landmark case finding state action on the basis of receipt of
Hill-Burton funds is the 1963 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital." The suit was
brought by black patients and doctors who were denied treatment and
staff privileges respectively by the defendant hospitals on the basis of
race.2 2  The court relied on two aspects of the Hill-Burton program to
support a finding of state action in accord with previous Supreme Court
holdings. First, participating Hill-Burton hospitals "operate as integral
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-91o (1970). Public and nonprofit hospitals are eligible. 42
U.S.C. § 291a(b).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 291d(a) (1)-(2) (1970).
18. E.g., Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.
1974); Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969); Cypress v.
Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967); Smith
v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966); Simkins v. Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938
(1964). See also Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
19. Civil No. 75-1161 (4th Cir. Nov. 6, 1975). Hill-Burton funding was not
necessary because the hospital involved was complying with a state law by refusing to
offer nontherapeutic abortions. Id. at 9. However, in an earlier unrelated case, this
same hospital was found to be "sufficiently imbued with state action by receipt of Hill-
Burton funds to invoke application of the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 7. That
finding came in Duffield v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 503 F.2d 512 (4th
Cir. 1974).
20. See Civil No. 75-1161 at 7-9.
21. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
22. Id. at 962.
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parts of comprehensive joint or intermeshing state and federal plans or
programs designed to effect a proper allocation of available medical and
hospital resources for the best possible promotion and maintenance of
public health."23  Thus the hospitals and the state were joint benefi-
ciaries within the rationale of Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority.2 4  The fact that the object of both the state and the hospitals
was to furnish the public with adequate medical care strengthens this
analysis. 25 Second, "[u]pon joining the program a participating State
in effect assumes, as a State function, the obligation of planning for
adequate hospital care," -0 and it is irrelevant for fourteenth amendment
purposes that the instrument utilized would otherwise be private. The
23. Id. at 967 (footnote omitted).
24. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Burton concerned a private restaurant, located in a
public building, that refused to serve blacks. The Court's finding of state action rested
in part on the benefits mutually conferred on the state and the restaurant because of the
restaurant's location.
By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made
itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, prop-
erty and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The State has so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that
account, cannot be considered to have been so "purely private" as to fall with-
out the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 725.However, recent Supreme Court decisions define state action narrowly. In 1972,
the Supreme Court decided Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), in
which state regulation pursuant to the issuance of a liquor license to a private club that
had discriminatory policies was held insufficient for a finding of state action. In 1974,
the Court held in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), that a state
regulated private utility company could terminate electric service to a consumer without
complying with formal due process requirements, despite its monopolistic status and the
essential nature of its product. By basing the holdings on the absence of state
involvement in the challenged activity, the Court appears to be limiting the holding of
Burton. However, the nature of the state's involvement with a Hill-Burton hospital is
more analogous to Burton than to either Moose Lodge or Jackson. By participating in
the Hill-Burton program, the state is essentially going into the hospital business. Offering
surgical procedures is the crux of that business. Therefore, there is a symbiotic
relationship between the state and the hospital that meets the requirements of Burton.
In addition, Moose Lodge and Jackson are distinguishable on the basis of the relation-
ship of the constitutional right to the entity involved. A finding of state action in Moose
Lodge would have required members of a private club to forfeit their freedom of
association as the price of a liquor license. In Jackson, the consumer was provided with
some procedural safeguards, and a utility company is not in the business of conducting
formal due process hearings. The infringement on the individual's right was slight as
compared to the potential burden of the utility of complying with formal due process
requirements. For an analysis of this balancing of interests, see Note, Public Utilities-
State Action and Informal Due Process After Jackson, 53 N.C.L. REV. 817, 827-28
(1975).
25. Note, Constitutional Law-State Actions-Denial of Abortion by Private Hos-
pital Receiving Federal Financial Support under the Hill-Burton Program does not
Constitute State Action., 2 FoRDoHA URnA L.J. 611, 618-19 (1974).
26. 323 F.2d at 968.
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hospital's performance of a state adopted function brings it within the
holding of Marsh v. Alabama.
2 7
Although Simkins dealt with racial discrimination, later Fourth
Circuit holdings demonstrate that the racial context was not the determi-
native factor. Relying on the Simkins analysis of the nature of the Hill-
Burton program, state action has been found in other factual contexts.
28
Although no clear basis exists for treating abortion and sterilization
cases differently, two occurrences in 1973 may prevent the extension of
the Fourth Circuit's state action theory to the abortion-sterilization area.
First, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, despite precedent other-
wise,29 held in Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hospital 0 that the receipt of Hill-
Burton funds is not a sufficient basis for a finding of state action
because the receipt of governmental funding does not establish that the
state was directly or indirectly involved in the hopsital's decision not to
offer such procedures-a position that other courts have since adopt-
ed.31 Second, Congress enacted the conscience clause of the Health
Programs Extension Act of 197332 forbidding courts to require a Hill-
27. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (corporate town). The Simkins court also cited: Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (primary); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)
(primary); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (primary). 393 F.2d at 968 n.15. See
also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876). But see Hudgens v. NLRB, 44 U.S.L.W.
4281 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1976), overruling Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan
Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), which held that a private shopping center was
sufficiently analogous to a business district to be imbued with state action to require that
first amendment rights be recognized on its premises. Whatever the potential effect of
Hudgens on Marsh, the state's participation in the Hill-Burton program still falls within
the holdings of the three Texas primary cases supra and within the sentiments expressed
in Munn, supra.
28. E.g., Duffield v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir.
1974) (denial of staff privileges must comply with due process); Sams v. Ohio Valley
Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969) (county residency requirement for staff
privilege eligibility violates due process and equal protection).
29. Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 133 (N.D. Ill. 1972). The
Seventh Circuit may be applying a double standard depending on the presence or absence
of racial discrimination. Note, 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J., supra note 25, at 617. The
author queries what the Seventh Circuit would do if a Hill-Burton hospital serving a
predominantly black community refused to treat sickle cell anemia. Id. at 619.
30. 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973).
31. Abortion-sterlization context: Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513
F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 433 (1975) (abortion); Chrisman v. Sisters of
St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974) (sterilization); Allen v. Sisters of Saint
Joseph, 361 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 490 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1974)
(sterilization). In general: Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Medical Center,
Inc., 507 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th
Cir. 1973); Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 506
F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974). Cf. Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosps. Inc., 487 F.2d 502
(6th Cir. 1973).
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7 (1974). The part of the Church Amendment relevant to
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Burton hospital to allow abortions or sterilizations if the hospital's
refusal is based on religious or moral grounds.
In Bellir, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals extended the
"specific act theory" of state action to apply to the abortion area. The
specific act theory was developed by the Second Circuit in Powe v.
Miles33 in relation to governmental funding of education. Powe held
that receipt of public funding is not a sufficient basis for a finding of
state action unless the state was involved directly or indirectly in the
specific act challenged. 4 Relying on the Supreme Court's failure in
Doe to invalidate the provision of the Georgia abortion statute that
allows hospitals to refuse to admit abortion patients, the Seventh Circuit
decided that as long as the state is neutral as to whether a Hill-Burton
hospital need offer such procedures, the hospital's decision will be free
of state action.3 5
The reluctance of the courts to find state action in the abortion-
sterilization area possibly reflects a hostility to the Roe and Doe deci-
sions36 and a repugnance to requiring hospitals to offer any particular
service.37  Despite these considerations, finding state action on the basis
of receipt of Hill-Burton funds has merit in the abortion-sterilization
context, as well as in the traditional situations. One purpose of the Hill-
Burton Act is "to assist the several States . . . to furnish adequate
this discussion is section 300a-7(a) (2) (A). For the relevant language, see text accom-
panying note 47 infra.
33. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
34. Id. at 81.
35. 479 F.2d at 760. "We think it is also clear that if a state is completely neutral
on the question whether private hospitals shall perform abortions, the state may
expressly authorize such hospitals to answer that question for themselves." Id. See note
15 supra. For analysis of Bellin's reliance on Doe, see text accompanying notes 44-45
infra.
36. The most striking example of judicial reluctance to find state action in the
abortion-sterilization context is the Fifth Circuit's decision in Greco v. Orange Memorial
Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 433 (1975). The hospital
in Greco, which was exempt from all local, state and federal taxation, was built on land
owned by the county, its construction was financed by interest-bearing county bonds and
Hill-Burton funds, and the building was leased to a private nonprofit corporation for one
dollar a year. The lease included a provision that the lessor county was relieved "'of the
responsibility and expense of operating a hospital."' Id. at 876. The reason for judicial
hostility may be the nature of the Roe decision itself. See Loewy, Abortive Reasons and
Obscene Standards: A Comment on the Abortion and Obscenity Cases, 52 N.C.L. REV.
223, 223-34 (1973).
37. This repugnance is explained in part by corporation law. The decisions made
by a corporation's board of directors are within the board's sound discretion. 1966
WAsm Urnv. L.Q., supra note 11, at 493. However, hospitals should not be governed
by corporation law. See note 11 supra. Cf. Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523
F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975).
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hospital, clinic, or similar services to all their people."3 All hospitals in
the state are taken into account in the allocation of Hill-Burton funds,
9
and the state has the power to preclude the construction of public
hospitals in an entire area by funneling these funds to private hospi-
tals.40  Since the Hill-Burton Act gives the state extensive control over
the types of hospitals available to the public, mere neutrality towards
each hospital's decision is insufficient to insure the exercise of an
individual's fundamental right "free of interference by the State." By
participating in the Hill-Burton program, the state is essentially going
into the business of providing medical care to all its inhabitants. As the
constitutional right involved is peculiarly related to what is now a state
function, this situation is distinguishable from recent United States
Supreme Court cases that define state action narrowly.41
Although Bellin distinguished Simkins on the ground that the
state's duty to require a hospital to comply with the constitutionally
sound nondiscriminatory regulations of the Hill-Burton Act implicated
the state in the hospital's discriminatory policies, 42 this analysis applies
just as well to the abortion-sterilization decisions. The only difference
is that the compulsion comes from the Supreme Court4 rather than
congressional mandate. However, the end result is the same: the hospi-
tal need only comply with the Constitution. In addition, the Bellin
court's reliance on Doe v. Bolton was misplaced. Besides the fact that
the Supreme Court did not expressly pass on the validity of that specific
provision of the Georgia abortion statute,44 the language in Doe shows
at most an intention to protect the denominational hospital. 45  Even if
the Seventh Circuit intended merely to protect the denominational hos-
pital, the effect of the specific act theory is to insulate all private Hill-
Burton hospitals from judicial attack. Protection of the denominational
hospital may be better discussed in connection with the Health Programs
Extension Act of 1973.
The second occurrence threatening the Fourth Circuit's position on
Hill-Burton funding was Congress' enactment of the conscience clause,
38. 42 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1970).
39. Note, Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation
and Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 256 (1974).
40. See Note, 4 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE, supra note 8, at 88-89.
41. See textual matter in notes 24 and 27 supra.
42. 479 F.2d at 761. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
43. See paragraph containing notes 9-15 supra.
44. The Bellin court recognized this fact. 479 F.2d at 760.
45. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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popularly known as the Church Amendment, of the Health Programs
Extension Act of 1973. This clause in relevant part states: 40
(a) The receipt of .. . [Hill-Burton funds] . . . by any ...
entity does not authorize any court ... to require
(2) such entity to-
(A) make its facilities available for -the performance of
any sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance
of such procedure or abortion in such facilities is prohibited
by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral con-
victions . . .
The conscience clause was passed in reaction to a preliminary injunction
issued in Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital8 enjoining the defendant
hospital from prohibiting the plaintiff's doctor from sterilizing her dur-
ing the delivery of her baby. In granting the injunction, the court found
receipt of Hill-Burton funds alone sufficient to support the state action
element of jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and 28 U.S.C.
section 1343. 41
As construed by the courts, the Church Amendment forbids a
judicial finding of state action on the basis of receipt of Hill-Burton
funds in the abortion-sterilization context if the hospital's refusal to
perform such procedures is based on religious or moral convictions.50
Concerning the scope of the statute, the United States District Court for
the District of Idaho has noted that" . . . recent congressional action
has effectively revoked the ability of a court to find state action on the
part of a hospital which receives Hill.Burton funds." 1  Although the
broadness of this language indicates that under no circumstances can a
court clothe a Hill-Burton hospital with state action,52 the Ninth Circuit
46. All future references to the Church Amendment apply only to the portion of
the clause quoted.
47. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7(a) (2) (A) (1974).
48. Civil No. 1090 (D. Mont. Nov. 1, 1972). The citation for the later trial of the
section 1983 action is: Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont.
1973), aff'd, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3492 (U.S. Mar. 2,
1976).
49. 1973 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEws 1473.
50. Cases construing the Church Amendment are: Chrisman v. Sisters of St.
Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974); Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F.
Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), ajf'd, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3492 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976); Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp.
799 (D. Idaho 1973), afj'd, 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975).
51. Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Idaho 1973),
a'd, 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975).
52. Note, 4 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoC. CHANCE, supra note 8, at 93 & n.75.
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gives the statute a much narrower construction, as shown in Chrisman v.
Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace.53 To determine the state action issue in
Chrisman, the court ignored Hill-Burton funding as a relevant factor
and proceeded to analyze other state connections with the defendant
hospital.5 4  The Chrisman interpretation of the statute's mandate is
probably correct.
The trial court in Taylor stated that the Church Amendment was a
valid exercise of congressional power to limit the jurisdiction of the
inferior courts under Article III of the Constitution.55 In Chrisman, the
Ninth Circuit held that the statute did not violate the establishment
clause of the first amendment since Congress' object in passing the
conscience clause was to retain neutrality."0 However, the statute has
yet to be challenged on the basis of legislative encroachment on the
judicial role of interpreting the Constitution.57 In light of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the judicial and legislative roles, a strong
constitutional attack could be made on this basis.
In Reynolds v. Sims, 58 the United States Supreme Court rejected
the argument that congressional approval of a plan that had a detrimen-
tal effect on the constitutional right to vote protected that plan from
judicial scrutiny. The Court stated: "Congress simply lacks the consti-
tutional power to insulate States from attack with respect to alleged
deprivations of individual constitutional rights."59 Therefore, Congress
lacks the power to define state action so as to deprive an individual of a
fundamental constitutional right. The fact that the conscience clause
may be construed as a valid exercise of the congressional power to limit
the jurisdiction of the federal courts is insufficient to protect the clause
from constitutional attack since a statute can be". . . unconstitutional
even though it was adopted by Congress as an exercise of federal
power."0 In Shapiro v. Thompson, 1 the Court noted that "Congress is
53. 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974).
54. Id. at 312.
55. 369 F. Supp. at 951. See Note, 4 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. C-ANGE, supra note
8, at 95-96.
56. 506F.2dat3ll.
57. This challenge was attemeted in Hodgson v. Anderson, but the court found the
plaintiffs did not have standing to make the challenge. 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn.
1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 903 (1975).
58. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
59. Id. at 582.
60. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969).
61. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Shapiro concerned statutory provisions denying welfare
assistance to otherwise qualified recipients because they failed to meet a one year
residency requirement. The Court held the provisions unconstitutional as a violation of
1976] 1315
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without power to enlist state cooperation in a joint federal-state program
by legislation which authorizes the States to violate the Equal Protection
clause."6 Although Congress' purpose in enacting the Church Amend-
ment was to afford protection to the denominational hospital, the vehicle
chosen has the effect of allowing the state to reap the benefits of the Hill-
Burton program while at -the same time denying the fundamental rights
of individuals by channeling funds to denominational hospitals.03
The conflict remains between the fundamental right recognized in
Roe and the desire to protect denominational hospitals recognized in
Doe. Although the Church Amendment was an attempt by Congress to
give the dictum in Doe statutory significance, statutory restraints on
judicial interpretation of the Constitution are not within Congress' pow-
er.64 However, a crucial question remains: does the denominational
hospital need protection? A finding of state action does not automati-
cally compel the hospital to offer abortions or sterilizations. The hospi-
tal may only be compelled if the individual does not have access to a
facility willing to allow the performance of these procedures. In the few
cases when the state refuses to furnish a clinic for these purposes and the
denominational hospital is the only facility available, the infringement
on the entity's religious or moral convictions is slight since the staff and
doctors involved in the performance of abortions and sterilizations must
not have any religious or moral objections to the procedures.05 As the
hospital need only provide its physical facilities for the performance of
such procedures, its interest should be subordinated to an individual's
fundamental rights. 6 Until the Supreme Court sees fit to clarify the
hospital's role in the abortion-sterilization area, the Fourth Circuit
should follow its own sound precedent when faced with this problem.
SUSIE MALPASS
the right to travel even though it assumed arguendo that Congress had approved the
statutes. Id. at 641.
62. Id. The Court relied on Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10
(1966).
63. See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
65. See Ambrose, The Milwaukee Story: A Public Hospital's Resistance to the
Supreme Court Abortion Rulings, 4 FAM. PLAN./PoP. R P. 68, 69 (1975). Cf. 42
U.S.C.A. § 300a-7(c) (1974).
66. Compare Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. at 803 with Note, 74
CoLTJM. L. REv., supra note 39, at 257-58, 261 for analysis of whether a hospital has a
first amendment right of freedom of religion.
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